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CLARA DEVLIEGER
London School of Economics and Political Science
Contractual dependencies:
Disability and the bureaucracy of begging in Kinshasa,
Democratic Republic of Congo
A B S T R A C T
One of the most conspicuous livelihood strategies for
physically disabled people in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic
of Congo, is a particular style of begging known locally as
“doing documents.” Confronted with the stigma of
begging, disabled beggars create documents in an attempt
to legitimize and regulate begging through formalization
and bureaucracy, presenting their relationship with donors
as NGO fund-raising and government tax-collecting. The
dynamics of petitioning for these “contractual
dependencies” provide a nuanced perspective on desired
dependencies: dependencies can be presented in multiple
ways, and people consider some dependencies more
legitimate and valuable than others. Recipients are not
passive but play a defining role in shaping these
relationships, seeking a balance between proximity and
desired distance to patrons. [dependence, disability,
distribution, bureaucracy, begging, temporality, Democratic
Republic of Congo]
B O K U S E
Na Kinshasa, moko ya bamayele ya kobika po na bato bazali
na tengu (handicape´s) ezali oyo babengaka: “kosalela
badocument” to “kosalela mikanda”. Bato ya tengu
basenga-sengaka lisungi pe ebimisaka bango
bisenga-senga. Po na kokima ebimiseli wana, bato ya tengu
bamisalela mikanda po na kondimisa kosenga na bango bo
ete eyebani na mobeko. Na boye bakomisa yango bo
likambo ezali kosalama na nzela pe endimami na leta pe
eyangelamaka na mikanda. Epayi ya bato bakopesa mosolo,
bamibimisaka lokola Lingomba ya bokumbeli makambo ya
leta te (ONG) ya bokongoli mosolo ya lisungi pe ya mpako
ya leta. Loyenge ya bolakisi mikanda ya “boyokani po na
kosalisama” epesi mwa bokeseni na etaleli ya kosalisama
oyo bango balingi. Kosalisama ekoki kolakisama na banzela
ebele. Na kati ya boyokani yango, bazwi-lisungi bamitikaka
te kasi bamitiaka nde na esika ya basengi na bolukaka
ndelo ya malamu kati na bango pe bakolo mimbongo.
[kosalisama, tengu, bokaboleli, boyangelami na mikanda,
bisenga-senga, botango, Ekolo Kongo ya Demokrasi]
B
egging is among the most prominent economic activi-
ties pursued by physically disabled people (handicape´s)
in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo.1 Marc was a
middle-aged disabled man with disfigured legs because
of childhood polio, who had alternated between begging
and other livelihood activities throughout his life. He told me that in
Kinshasa there were three categories of disabled beggars. The first
he called beggars who sit (alone), bamendiants bafandaka, because
“it’s too difficult for them to walk.” The second was beggars who
walk alone or in pairs, bamendiants batambolaka, and usually make
rounds on Friday and Saturday. On Friday, they would go tomosques
and businesses belonging to Muslims, mostly merchants who were
Lebanese and fromWest African backgrounds. Saturdays, he toldme,
were days for everyone; it was the generally accepted day for beggars
to make their rounds.
But the defining practice of disabled people who beg in the
center of Kinshasa today formed the third category: those who “do
documents” (batu basalaka documents), also known as documen-
taires. In contrast to other categories of beggars, they formed large
groups of up to 15 people. While most beggars approached poten-
tial donors with pleading looks, extended hands, and gestures ex-
pressing hunger, documentaires took a different tack: they presented
a potential donor with a photocopied document requesting con-
tributions for a specific purpose (see Figure 1). Documentaires de-
scribed the system tome as an agreement or “contract” between beg-
gar and donor. If the donor “bought” the document and the group
was successful in obtaining funding, donors kept it as a receipt and
hung it up to display. It showed that the giver had donated to dis-
abled people and was no longer obliged to give to other groups.
In the exchange, the group of beggars would not return to solicit
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Figure 1. Examples of documents used by some beggars in Kinshasa, in 2013 and 2014. These documents, presented by a group of beggars to a potential
donor, requested contributions for a specific purpose. If the donor “bought” the document, the donor kept it as a “receipt.” In exchange, the beggars
agreed not to solicit contributions for the purpose written on the document for another year.
contributions for the purpose written on the document for
another year.2
In many descriptions of begging, the obligation to give
is framed in terms of religious charity, particularly from the
givers’ point of view (Appadurai 1990; Iliffe 1987; Renne
2010). For documentaires, in contrast, religious charity
was at best a minor undertone. Their system instead
deliberately evoked NGO fund-raising and government
tax-collection. Adapting to Kinshasa’s multicultural and
multifaith social makeup, documentaires chose to per-
suade people to give by speaking the secular language
of the state and that of international humanitarianism.
Begging has been described as a form of interaction
that subverts ordinary systems of exchange, since beggars
bargain from a position of weakness, making claims based
not on what they can reciprocate but on what they lack
(Gomm1975, 536). The practice of the documentaires shows
the reality of this subversion, yet, faced with perceptions of
begging as unidirectional and inappropriate, they tried to
present their relationship with “donors” as reciprocal. Pre-
senting themselves as an NGO, the “receipt” beggars gave
wasmeant to represent an understanding between the beg-
gars, the donor, and (implicitly) the government, thus le-
gitimizing the act of begging by imitating the practices of
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a state bureaucracy. Yet while the documentaires’ system
rests on an ideal of social welfare entitlement, it operates in
tension with a moral logic of dignity derived from personal
independence and “honest” work, a logic that often clashes
with common perceptions of disabled beggars as suspect
and aggressive. Questions of entitlement, the nature of obli-
gation, and how to identify those who “deserve” aid and
care are at the contested heart of a fractious relationship be-
tween beggar and donor.
The practice of “doing documents” provides an op-
portunity to reconceptualize desired relationality within
subordinate relationships, exploring the conflicting moral
imagination surrounding independence or desired depen-
dencies (Ferguson 2013). Because begging is highly con-
troversial, presenting a dependent relationship as “contrac-
tual” and spreading such relationships over a wide network
are beggars’ strategies to manage a stigmatized occupa-
tion and maintain a degree of desired autonomy. The act
of solicitation, examined from a petitioner’s point of view,
demonstrates that dependencies are multiple and that cer-
tain types of dependent relationships are more valued than
others. Overemphasis on the benefits of being attached or
detached from others risks obscuring the effort dependents
put into delineating the boundaries of desired dependen-
cies. Rather than passively maintaining subordinate rela-
tionships, petitioners play an active role in shaping how
they are portrayed and temporally regulated. They do this
by, among other things, drawing on the symbolic and regu-
latory power of bureaucracy.
Dependency and the desired social contract
In its form and language, the documentaire system most
clearly echoed the history of increased secularization and
specialization of welfare institutions (Iliffe 1987, 193), and
especially the “NGOization” of Kinshasa since the 1990s.
Documents presented beggars as an NGO, using drawings
of themselves as beneficiaries and a congratulatory phrase
praising shopkeepers’ “contributions” as benefactors giving
for a good cause.3 The wider “NGOization” of social move-
ments has profoundly affected how people express claims
tomembership by, among other things, orienting people to-
ward discourses of “development” (Ferguson 1990) or citi-
zen “empowerment” (Prince 2013), discourses that express
a desire to live free from dependence on others.
But the NGO form of the documentaire system also
reflects the state’s position in estimations of social welfare.
Particularly in Kinshasa since the early 1990s, civil society
associations have become “vital components of the survival
strategies invented by Kinois [inhabitants of Kinshasa] to
replace the state in many areas of public life” (Giovan-
noni et al. 2004, 99). They are a critical means by which
Kinois obtain resources and express claims of membership.
Modern states often outsource governance rather than
governing directly (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 16). But
while NGOs increasingly act on the state’s behalf, the ideal
of the state as responsible for the welfare of citizens in
Kinshasa remains strong. Presenting the begging group as
an “NGO” goes hand in hand with presenting the activity
as “tax collecting.” By presenting their livelihood through
the lens of more acceptable forms of raising revenue,
documentaires try to navigate an occupation that is widely
stigmatized as the ultimate form of negative dependency,
an occupation opposed to the values of independence that
are embedded in languages of “development.”
In many societies, one becomes a person throughmul-
tiple attachments to others rather than by conceptualizing
the self as an independent individual (e.g., Mahmood 2005;
Strathern 1988). The degree to which personhood is shaped
by valuing (in)dependence inevitably affects perceptions of
disability. Where sociocultural environments place strong
emphasis on independence, such as the Euro-American
West, the dependency of disabled people on others can
attract discrimination and stigma, since people perceive
them as unable to fulfill ideals of independence (e.g.,
Albrecht 2003; Kittay 1999; Murphy 1987). But disability
in other societies can be more associated with the “socio-
centric” value of being part of social networks of dependen-
cies rather than with individual work capacity, appearance,
or ability (e.g., Livingston 2006; Nicolaisen 1995; Whyte and
Ingstad 1995, 11). Dependencies on others, in this perspec-
tive, can be not a backward system but a valued achieve-
ment and a route toward social mobility (e.g., Ferguson
2013; Penfield 2017; Scherz 2014). In sub-Saharan Africa,
“wealth in people” (Guyer 1993;Miers and Kopytoff 1977) as
amode of political power and a way of becoming a valuable
person demonstrates how dependencies can be desired. In
precolonial southern Africa, for example, dependence was
a social systembuilt around political leaders who competed
for followers (Ferguson 2013). Far from being a passive con-
dition, dependency on a powerful leader was a “mode of
action” (Bayart 2000). Relations of dependence continue to
be sought after, James Ferguson (2013) argues, because this
is not only away of structuring society but also away of con-
structing persons. If disabled people cannot fulfill ideals of
“independent” labor, they may still be able to find value as
persons through dependent relations with others. But not
all forms of dependency are equal. In common perception,
people in Kinshasa widely considered begging an activity
that diminishes a person’s value; people often referred
to beggars as “worthless people” (batu pamba) because
they viewed them as relying entirely on others and unable
to support dependents of their own. Tensions over value
judgments were critical to the documentaires’ performance.
Dependencies are enacted and performed in value
transactions, particularly in displays of giving. Whereas
analyses of such acts traditionally privilege matters of
giving and take the giver’s viewpoint, considering the act
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of solicitation and the active role of the receiver highlights
these relationships’ unequal nature (cf. Retsikas 2016;
Widlok 2013; Woodburn 1998). A social and historical per-
spective demonstrates how people are affected by changing
ideas about (in)dependence (e.g., Fraser and Gordon 1994;
Lamb 2013). Careful attention to practices of solicitation in
one historical moment, however, reveals that people view
certain types of dependencies as more dignified and moral
than others, and that recipients are far from passive in
shaping the asymmetrical relationships they seek. Petition-
ers can present the controversial dependencies they engage
in as positive by, among other things, portraying these
dependencies as governed by mutually agreed-on limits.
Where there are multiple opinions about the acceptability
of relying on others, informal bureaucracies can regulate
unequal relationships.
Making the rounds
Many people I met during my fieldwork engaged from time
to time in “doing documents.” For some, “documents” was
a permanent full-time activity; others dipped in and out.
Even the full-timers combined earnings from “documents”
with other sources.
Since I was familiar with at least one group member, I
was generally not considered an object of begging; on the
contrary, groups often insisted on sharing profits with me.
But the response to the prospect ofmy accompanying them
varied considerably.Where one group of women feared that
donors would refuse to give on the assumption they were
receiving money from me, one group of men paraded me
and put me forward as a mascot: they presented me to ev-
ery shopkeeper and sometimes told the shopkeeper half-
jokingly to “watch out” and to “treat them well” because I
was doing research and could portray them negatively. That
my presence affected their performance was obvious, yet
how they involved or excluded me in the practice was illu-
minating in itself.
Routine and negotiation
I went out one daywith a pair of disabledwomennamedEs-
merelda and Jacqueline, accompanied by Esmerelda’s baby
and a pair of young able-bodied helpers. Groups of docu-
mentaireswere often single sex; splitting into gender groups
was apparently a newer technique that was advantageous
for women. When shopkeepers told beggars that they had
already given to disabled people, they would reply that the
donors had given to men and that they also needed to give
to women.
The documents that Esmerelda and Jacqueline “sold”
to shopkeepers were somewhat typical of the genre. They
resembled formal Congolese correspondence. Each dis-
played the national flag at the top and a stamp and sig-
nature from the leader of the delegation at the bottom,
and presented the begging group as an NGO or non-
profit organization (association sans but lucratif), confirm-
ing its legitimacy and official authority. Along with an
(often crude) illustration of disabled people, the middle
of the document had the layout of a receipt. Before ar-
riving at a business, whoever could best read and write
would fill in a photo-copy with the name of the busi-
ness, an optimistic sum to be donated, and a purpose for
the money: new school year expenses, a disabled people’s
home, or just food. Finally, the document often encour-
aged the donor to feel good about themselves and dis-
play their generosity, carrying the motto “I’ve contributed
to support the well-being and occupations of disabled
people.”
But the document’s sentiment of conviviality and of-
ficial regularity was often at odds with the exchange it-
self. After several disappointments in the late morning, we
moved on to a shop selling air-conditioning systems. The
two women told their young helpers to raise them up on
the pavement in front of the shop, and Esmerelda blocked
the door with her tricycle. “The person who deals with [koy-
amba, lit. to welcome, to receive] that isn’t here,” someone
said from inside. “We’ll give him the document.” Esmerelda
gestured to one of her young men to take the document
inside, but a security guard came over and said Esmerelda
would have to go herself; he did notwant a street child going
inside. She got into a loud argument with him but climbed
off the tricycle, taking her baby with her, and tried to go in
with crutches.
One of the shop assistants told her to calm down, and
she declared, defiantly, “Come get the document so we’ll
get money. We’ll sit here for two hours!” Jacqueline too got
off her tricycle and moved to the middle of the shop floor,
clients and workers sitting around her on chairs. Esmerelda
continued to block the door with her tricycle, and both
of them started declaiming, “They pay! They pay! [Bafuta!
Bafuta!]” They were making a scene; people stared, and in-
side the clients and workers looked on, embarrassed.
Workers tried to persuade the women to come back the
next day, but Esmerelda and Jacqueline refused. After an-
other loud argument, they eventually gave in. “This is a ren-
dezvous you’re giving us,” they said, implying that they had
reached a business agreement. As wewere leaving, the shop
womanwho had persuaded themwaved and beamed at Es-
merelda’s baby, bringing out smiles from themother as well.
They grinned and waved as we left, the rancor of the previ-
ous scene apparently forgotten.
Esmerelda and Jacqueline’s experience was rather
typical for a first approach to a new business, a certain
routine involving force, negotiation, and performance. It
was common for employees to claim that the shop owner
was absent, that the business was doing badly or that there
was no money on hand at the moment, and to attempt to
remove the documentaires. The disabled beggars forcefully
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Figure 2. Documentaires, or those who beg using documents in Kinshasa,
wait outside a housewares shop while their spokesperson approaches shop-
keepers inside, February 19, 2014. [This figure appears in color in the
online issue]
imposed their bodies and tricycles to escalate the situation
from proposition to demand. They did this, they told me,
because too often they were told to come back without
result. They would tell the person they would wait, often
taking up a substantial amount of the business space
(see Figure 2). “Soliciting . . . anticipates a partnership,
and thereby creates the position of the donor, as well as
prefiguring the act of giving itself,” observes Kostas Retsikas
(2016, 4).
Once the right person accepted a document, the sit-
uation calmed down and more ordinary processes of ne-
gotiation would begin. In contrast to situations in other
societies in which beggars combine a latent menace
with a performance of humility and subservience (e.g.,
Appadurai 1990; Iliffe 1987, 18–19, 32–33, 249; Staples 2007,
184), interactions between documentaires and donors mir-
rored local practices of (market) bargaining. Beggars var-
ied in their personal styles: some acted submissively and
dressed shabbily, while others, usually group spokespeople,
were assertive and better taken care of. A business owner
usually declared that the amount requested was far too
high and offered a smaller amount. The beggars would then
likely refuse to take the money, saying it was too little, or
try to persuade the donor to give more. The donor might
raise the amount, telling them to take it or leave it. Nego-
tiation could lead to heated discussions, although the tone
would be largely positive; once they had begun negotiating,
the beggars knew they would not be leaving empty handed.
Audience, performance, and cultural codes
In theory, beggars wrote three or four purposes on the doc-
uments. Most successful were collections to celebrate New
Year’s festivities and for the return of children to school,
while less so were solicitations to celebrate Independence
Day and Easter or to fix up housing. In practice, however,
beggars did not necessarily use the money they collected
for the purpose they declared on the document, and they
sometimes returned to businesses with other reasons for
their request.
Beggars also changed their routines when they antici-
pated an exceptional gift from certain donors, and profes-
sional beggars kept track of where and when they might
expect such extravagances. Those who were well informed
had an advantage in accessing these exceptional gifts,
which donors gave on a first come, first served basis. Pri-
vate, large-scale factory businesses gave gifts of money or
goods at certain times during the year, especially around
New Year. A soap factory gave free soap to 500 disabled peo-
ple once a month, a cement company was rumored to give
$10,000 once a year, a bank $1,000 a year, a bread factory
$5,000 twice a year.4 But from time to time companies or
individuals performed an unexpected, truly sensational act
of generosity.
The first time I participated in begging, I witnessed
such an exceptional event with a group of disabled men.
After several unsuccessful visits, we walked to the large
home of a prominent politician in an upmarket residential
area. Waiting for the politician to leave his compound, the
group secretary took out his folder full of papers and started
preparing a document. After praising the politician’s activ-
ities as a “work of art,” he said they were asking for help
to send 36 children of disabled people back to school. Pre-
viously, they had presented him with the gift of a bronze
sculpture from the local art market, along with a letter ap-
plauding his political work.
After a long wait, the politician left the compound, and
from our space in the hot sun they praised him, loudly. He
was visibly irritated, but when he returned from his visit
next door, he suddenly called the group president into his
compound and presented him with 3 million francs (ca.
$3,333), a small fortune. The group sped away with the
money, followed by several onlookers, and went to a quiet
place to calculate how much they had received and how
to distribute it among themselves. Everyone who had been
part of their operation received a share of the cash, from
the policemen who guarded the politician’s house and had
not chased them away, to the newspaper sellers and other
youngmenwho served as the beggars’ “legs” (as they called
them) by informing them that the politician was around, to
the young boys who pushed some of the disabled people’s
wheelchairs.
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Since beggars usually ended the day with only $5 to
$10 each, this event became legendary. A year later, people
still spoke about how they might, once again, persuade the
politician to give. Later, I was told that the politician had
refused to give anymore, angry that disabled people kept
coming back and in larger groups. Yet occasionally I would
still hear that he had promised money, and those who were
informed would cancel all other plans to wait outside his
residence.
A routine verbal activity can easily become familiar
as a genre of performance (Barber 2007), and the ges-
tures of force and negotiation between beggars were just
such a familiar performance. As Arjun Appadurai (1990,
108) has pointed out, begging is “not completely removed
from the arena of . . . performance” because the conven-
tions of interaction are “public and highly orchestrated.”
In Kinshasa, as elsewhere, beggars invoke shared social
codes when trying to appeal to potential donors, and
the genre characteristics of petition depended on these
codes.
While the document’s form most clearly referenced
the dynamics of NGO fund-raising, in addressing potential
donors the documentaires tried to invoke a moral relation-
ship between superior and inferior. As part of the perfor-
mance, Esmerelda and Jacqueline’s defiant and angry de-
mand for payment, or the beggars’ praise of the politician,
was not intended to represent their inner feelings. They
drew rather on a shared understanding of disabled peo-
ple as “deserving poor” in a recognized system of redis-
tribution. They deployed “coercive subordination” to “trap
[potential benefactors] in the cultural implications of their
roles as superiors, that is, in the obligation to be generous”
(Appadurai 1990, 101; cf. Staples 2007). Flattery and gift giv-
ing are local cultural practices employed to evoke this obli-
gation, practices in which leaders are fashioned as fathers
expected to “feed” their inferiors in return for their loyalty
(Schatzberg 2001), and in which generous giving engenders
prestige.
As the example of the politician demonstrates, beg-
ging could easily merge into gift exchange between clients
and patrons, since verbal praise and the bronze sculpture
were “exchanged” for the lavish donation. Politicians in
Kinshasa often make public displays of distributing goods
to “vulnerable” populations such as disabled people, or-
phans, or the elderly. Furthermore, the beggars’ written
and oral flattery invokes models of patronage common
in many parts of Africa (e.g., Barber 1989; Irvine 1989;
Vail and White 1991), and which hold a prominent po-
sition in various aspects of Kinois popular culture (e.g.,
White 1999; Pype 2015). Beggars performed deference as a
“declaration of dependence” to extract resources (Bonilla
2013; Penfield 2017), and the declaration had a coercive
edge.
Begging as an occupation
From “deserving” to “dishonest”: The tense relationship
between beggar and donor
Benefactors were not always willing participants in beggars’
performances. Many benefactors, and indeed the beggars
themselves, were often ambivalent about the acceptability
of begging as a livelihood, describing documents as a legiti-
mate occupation on one occasion, while condemning beg-
ging on another.
In a positive assessment, beggars and nonbeggars alike
presented begging as an acceptable and necessary form of
making a living for disabled people when they were con-
sidered “deserving poor.” Disability may qualify disabled
people for occupations such as begging (Fassin 1991; Iliffe
1987;Whyte and Ingstad 1995, 14), especially if a society de-
fines disability as an inability to do productive labor (Rose
2015). People would commonly tell me that disabled peo-
ple were not to blame for their situation and that, because
of their physical condition and lack of education, they un-
derstandably could not work. Even if a disabled applicant
had a diploma, interlocutors were quick to point out, com-
panies in Kinshasa would refuse the hassle associated with
hiring and employing them. They therefore accepted beg-
ging as the regrettable but sole solution for survival. Peo-
ple in Kinshasa associated the plight of the disabled with
lack of government support, invoking ideals of redistribu-
tion through state-organized social welfare and responsibil-
ity toward a deserving citizenry. During one begging trip, I
talked to a man visiting a neighboring compound. When I
told him about my research, he told me,
If you see them, you have to give without hesitation.
Look at them, they can’t do anything in that condi-
tion, so you have to give to them. You shouldn’t take
them as beggars [mendiants] but as disabled people
[handicape´s] at the end. A disabled person can’t work
fields, do commerce. [. . .] It’s necessary that someone
explains [this] to the government to help them. Even if
they havework, it’s necessary to give themmoney at the
end of the month. They’re abandoned. The state has to
help them, not leave them. [. . .] The state should build
large building blocks for them where you can live with
5,000 people . . . . The state should give them tricycles,
flour, rice, and $200 a month.
More often, however, people countered, supplemented, or
voiced the opinion that begging is necessary or even pos-
itive simultaneously with the idea that begging, even for
disabled people, is unacceptable. Stigmatization is readily
apparent in the language used to refer to the documen-
taire system of solicitation. The term documentaire itself
is a euphemism, used by practitioners and their entourage
to distinguish it from outright “begging” (mendier), the
6
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activity framed as “asking for help” (kosenga assistance).
The term documentaire, furthermore, is ironic and fits with
the dry humor of Kinshasa (Devlieger 2018). Adding the
French nominal suffix -aire to the end of document eu-
phemistically turns the word into a name for an occupation
for “someonewho does documents” in the sameway it does
for parlementaire (parliamentarian) or bibliothe´caire (li-
brarian). Morphologically turning “documents” into a pro-
fession produced a smirking laugh when someone heard
the term for the first time, since it tacitly conflated begging
with salaried, “respectable” occupations.
Because of its ironic subtext, some documentaires
found the term embarrassing and did not use it to describe
themselves. Those who did refer to themselves as a doc-
umentaire exploited its irony and were confident enough
to make antiestablishment jokes using the term. Most beg-
gars whom I asked about their occupation referred to them-
selves as NGO workers. If I was able to ask further, they
would more often reluctantly tell me they “do documents,”
or softly tell me they were, after all, amendiant.
Many people, however, thought begging was not
merely an embarrassing but a “dishonest” occupation, one
adopted by people with a “bad mentality.” Suspicions col-
ored the willingness of potential donors to give, because
they doubted whether the petitioner was a suitable recipi-
ent (Bornstein 2012). Many said disabled people were per-
fectly capable of engaging in ordinary livelihood strategies
but were unwilling to do so; beggars (and not only dis-
abled ones) were dishonest, “undeserving poor,” likely fak-
ing a disability or otherwise lying about their ability to pur-
sue “good honest work” (Groce, Loeb and Murray 2014;
Retsikas 2016). “They’re faking [bazokosa, from the verb
kokosa],” suspicious donors regularly warned me, the Lin-
gala word carrying the meaning of both verbal deception
and forgery. Stories of beggars’ tricks went around among
(especially foreign) business owners: beggars faking blind-
ness with the help of a pair of sunglasses, fooling new
business owners into paying for false market taxes, sending
children to beg while an adult hid behind a car, or working
together with police to arrest a (foreign) business owner for
an “infraction.”
Along with suspected dishonesty, people were discon-
tented about how documentaires were rumored to extract
donations. While disabled people were widely stigmatized
as “difficult,” many people in Kinshasa often considered
documentaires particularly aggressive, potentially violent,
and prone to apply mafia-like tactics to gang up on those
who refused to pay. Disabled people invoked both compas-
sion and fear; deformed legs served as a metonym for in-
capacity, but accompanying crutches or sticks could swiftly
become dangerous weapons. Able-bodied people could ex-
press a degree of sympathy or comprehension for the frus-
trations of disabled people, yet they described disabled beg-
gars as extorting criminals. One journalist writing in the
early 2000s described large groups of disabled beggars in
Kinshasa as ferocious, using “gangsterish tactics” to make
frightened shopkeepers pay up, threatening to smash win-
dows and beat up guards (Wrong 2001, 7–8). “At times,”
Christian Lund (2006, 697) observes, “there is a fine line . . .
between collecting a market-place tax and running a pro-
tection racket.” Rather than a positive, moral relationship
of dependence, unsympathetic donors could equally view
disability “taxes” as extortion.
“The hungry stomach has no ears,” admitted Claude,
a middle-aged disabled man with a limp hand damaged
by polio. A professional beggar, he kept a schedule on a
piece of paper of who was giving what, when, and where;
when there were no specific events to heed to, he spent
most of his time walking between businesses with a rela-
tively fixed group of beggars. He gave me examples of when
things could escalate: when security personnel blocked ac-
cess to the boss; when beggars could tell that a business
had an abundance of money yet refused to give; when they
received several appointments to collect and were contin-
uously put off; or when donors called the police to chase
them away. In these cases, beggars felt they were getting
blocked or disrespected, or that promises were not being
kept.Matching the suspicion of the donors, the beggars sus-
pected universal deceit over the reality of disposable, or dis-
tributable, income.
But both beggars and potential donors could connect
the reputation for violence to the illegitimacy of the enter-
prise. Marc, an ex-beggar, was particularly negative. He had
changed from begging to border trade when an opportu-
nity came up to work with a friend, making the change be-
cause he started having children and he did not want them
growing up seeing him like that. “[I stopped] so I’ll have
honor, value,” Marc said. “I didn’t want people saying ‘the
man of [that] woman asks for money.’” Explaining the dif-
ference between documentaires and other beggars, he spec-
ified, “Those who do documents take things by force and
brutality. It’s not good.” He confessed that he had also done
it in the past and that sometimes it would get very “hot.”
“All of it is bad,” he explained, referring to the aggression at
the heart of the documentaire practice. “The money you’re
getting isn’t with a good heart . . . . The money for your chil-
dren’s schooling is [soiled by] sins.”
Bureaucratic imitation: Taxes and contracts
The relationship between donor and beggar had not always
been so contested, beggars told me. During Mobutu Sese
Seko’s dictatorship, giving to people with disabilities had
been a social “obligation,” but the end of the regime and
the economic collapse of the 1990s brought a whirlwind of
changes: the number of beggars rose, fewer people gave,
and charity was increasingly criticized as treating the symp-
toms rather than the cause. Beggars’ accounts of patrons’
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Figure 3. An untitled painting by Kinshasa artist Bosoku Ekunde, 2014.
The painting depicts documentaires, or those who beg using documents in
Kinshasa. While the artist made the painting at the author’s request, he
chose to depict the international population from which beggars request
donations. From left to right, he shows documentaires begging from people
of West African, Asian, and Congolese origin; both beggars and donors
point at documents. In the foreground, he depicts individual beggars.
[This figure appears in color in the online issue]
dwindling support mirrored the increased dissolution of
kinship obligations.Whilemen increasingly could not fulfill
responsibilities to provide, women and young people could
appropriate existing patterns of authority in new and flexi-
ble ways by, for example, disengaging from family expecta-
tions and responsibilities (De Boeck and Plissart 2004, 194).
Unable to count on patrons or kin, beggars experienced in-
creasing shame and hostility while resources diminished
with nothing to fill the void.
In this tense, contested situation, the document
emerged as a social code through which beggars tried to
ease communication between themselves and the various
(frequently hostile) potential donors. While the beggars
were familiar with practices associated with religious tra-
ditions, the universal and bureaucratic language of NGO
fund-raising and state tax-collection proved most useful in
a multicultural capitalist economy, dominated by foreign-
ers who did not necessarily feel affiliation with local logics
nor adhered to one dominant religion (see Figure 3). Docu-
ments simultaneously enact a range of regulatory author-
ities (McKay 2012). Next to the beggars’ documents, one
paper often found taped to shopwindows was the govern-
mental receipt for market taxes (see Figure 4). When the
documentaires’ self-presentation as an “NGO” failed to con-
vince potential donors that they were industrious and de-
serving, evoking taxes implied that people should view do-
nations as obligatory rather than voluntary, and not just in
an extortionate manner.
The beggars collect donations in much the same way
as the state collects taxes, going from shop to shop. The
Figure 4. A shopwindow full of documents used by some beggars in Kin-
shasa, January 28, 2014. In the lower left-hand corner are market tax
receipts. [This figure appears in color in the online issue]
disabled beggars’ letter was structured as a formal receipt,
named the country, and invoked the city of Kinshasa, and
thus closely resembled tax documents. During my field-
work, businesses paid taxes for many ministries and ser-
vices, but not for the Ministry of Social Affairs, which was
notionally responsible for handicape´s.5 Business owners
knew this, and many disabled beggars did as well; beg-
gars explicitly invoked this social gap in public provision to
justify the autonomous collection of disability “taxes.” The
logic of governmental order and responsibility implied in
the documentaires’ letters, therefore, is echoed by some to
justify begging as an indictment of state absence, in which
disability is amark of entitled incapacity that the state ought
to compensate.
People often viewed an ideal state welfare system as
conforming to the values of a hierarchical social system in
which superiors are expected to be generous and responsi-
ble for care, as witnessed in the beggars’ encounter with the
politician. The documents gave this desired responsibility
a notional reality between donor and petitioner, indicting
the absence of the state even as they evoked its regulation.
Conversely, a document could appeal as protection against
what suspicious donors perceived as predatory behavior.
Proof of payment for market taxes safeguards one from get-
ting taxed twice by a “smiling-snarling” state (Schatzberg
1988) that provides little services for taxes; displaying proof
of disability “taxes” followed similar logics of prevention.
Begging is viewed as a failure of the welfare state by
Western academics and politicians as much as by the docu-
mentaires of Kinshasa (Dean 2000; Mun˜oz and Potter 2014).
It is, in fact, the most institutionalized form of social secu-
rity (Renne 2010, 70), but it operates outside the state. It
can even seem opposed to the state, or at least to state in-
terests; in Kinshasa and elsewhere, local communities can
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see beggars as a menace (Groce, Loeb and Murray 2014;
Iliffe 1987, 93). Beggars may be affected by the city’s large-
scale “cleanup” operations, or directly targeted by oper-
ations aimed at removing and rehabilitating them (e.g.,
Kassah 2008; Silla 1998).6
Beggars’ use of state-like bureaucracy to bring the im-
age and form of the state into the field of begging thus goes
beyond appealing to cross-cultural symbols to calm ten-
sions that delegitimize begging. Documents can realize de-
sired realities (Bear 2001; Mathur 2012), a capacity that is
closely related to the imagination and reproduction of state
and civil society organizations (Gonc¸alves 2013; Hansen
and Stepputat 2001; Poole 2004). Postcolonial bureaucra-
cies often function by combining official regulations with
informal norms, resulting in processes of “informal priva-
tization” when government officials offer services for per-
sonal payment (Blundo 2006; Olivier de Sardan 2008).
Through their practices of power (Mbembe 1992), doc-
umentaires engaged with the idea of NGOs and the state, if
not with the institutions themselves, and in doing so they
adapted processes of “informal privatization” to suit their
needs. As Veena Das (2004, 245) observes, the state can be
“multiplied, literalized through court papers, certificates,
and forged documents, it can enter the life of the commu-
nity.” The state can remain elusive and yet leave its “sig-
nature,” a “spectral presence materialized in documents”
(250–51) that can extend the state into domains of private
life that are otherwise inaccessible to bureaucratic prac-
tices. Documentaires seek, even forge, this signature, and
they evoke the spectral presence of NGOs and the state be-
hind their request for assistance.7 The act of appropriation
in the documents was therefore less about the power of the
state than about its legitimate authority (Meagher 2012).
The signs of regulation evoked by documents could lend le-
gitimacy to a practice that, in its bare forms, was too easily
dismissed as illegitimate (Lund 2006, 692).
Balancing acts: Between autonomy
and dependence
Autonomously collecting social security payments was thus
a personal social contract asmuch as one between state and
citizen, and in a positive judgment of the activity this con-
tractual relationship was paramount. With beggars I got to
knowwell, there was more space to discuss positive aspects
of “documents” as something akin to relationshipswith pre-
vious employers. Sometimes they justified and defended
themselves defiantly, without prompting from me, indicat-
ing how aware they were of the negative view on their activ-
ities. Claude, for example, had held various occupations in
his life. He had traded across the border between Kinshasa
and Brazzaville (Republic of Congo) from 1987 to 1997, but
he had gone bust when authorities in Brazzaville destroyed
his goods around the fall of Mobutu. He then managed a
shopbelonging to aWest Africanmerchant until 1999, when
his boss went bankrupt and left the country. Ever since the
pillages started by underpaid soldiers that swept through
the country in 1991 and 1993, he had tried occasional beg-
ging, which became full time when his boss departed. Like
others, Claude made a strong distinction between mendi-
ants and documentaires:
Claude: OK, you see this [points to the paper], the paper
I gave you?
Clara: Yes.
Claude: This is a contract we sign with them once a
year. It’s a document you give, like a tax of the disabled.
You give memoney and I leave you the paper.
Clara: Yes.
Claude: But when [an individual mendiant] puts out
their hand like this [shows the palm of his hand], you
give him [money], but he won’t give you a paper. [. . .]
Our paper is a conventionwe signwith economic oper-
ators [. . .] even though ours is [also] help [given] [aide],
ours is on paper [. . .] [and it’s only] once a year, that’s
it. [. . .] You see, so the difference is large.
Clara: OK, I see that with documents you’re kind of
organized . . .
Claude: Yes, it’s a [type of] begging that’s well organized.
At the heart of his distinction, echoed by many others,
Claude distinguished “documents” from other types of beg-
ging by the importance of a good relationship with donors.
For Claude, it was a more “responsible” and “organized”
type of begging, upholding these good relationships, bound
by a “contract,” which was exchanged for donations, giving
recognition to the donor, with an agreed time limit on re-
peated requests. The “contract” was an attempt to regular-
ize the temporalities of precarious dependencies. “Ours is
on paper”; the document here symbolized their agreement
and formalized the relationship and transaction. The “sale”
of a document implied the start or continuation of a rela-
tionship rather than the end of it; it was a way of comply-
ing with the will of a donor, who would appreciate the tem-
poral regularity and organization expressed in the promise
of being obliged to donate only once a year. Documents
can thus be used to manipulate the timing of policy imple-
mentation, which produces and reinforces bureaucratic au-
thority (Gonc¸alves 2013). In an environment marked by a
presentist orientation to time (Jewsiewicki 2013), the “con-
tract” was an attempt to harness this ongoing authority and
temporality. Again, the comparison to tax collecting and the
eternal (absent) power of the state played an important role:
paying taxes is a never-ending duty, an ongoing relationship
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rather than a single transaction. Time and authority were
marked on paper, records that were kept and displayed.
Begging is “an activity which allows an individual to call
upon people withwhomhe or she has no close ties for small
donations to meet basic needs” (Groce, Loeb, and Murray
2014, 2), but for Claude it was more. A sociable person,
Claude had spent many years building a wide network of
relationships through begging. Compared to other beggars
without such relationships, he was self-confident about
“documents,” while others were ashamed. While these oth-
ers stressed desperation, for Claude there was more to it
than absolute need. His network gave him social value, and
upholding the relationships required social skills that not
everyone could master. In cultivating “deliberate depen-
dencies” (Englund 2006, 189), he found freedom in building
up continuing relationships with donors through a literal
paper pledge to loyalty, the temporal continuity beingmore
socially and morally valued than short-term relationships
based on one-off transactions. He considered his mode of
begging more meaningful and valuable than that of the in-
dividual beggars, who remained seated with outstretched
hands.
Except when dealing with a naive newcomer to the city,
donors were well aware that documentaires rarely repre-
sented a substantive NGO and that the money was likely
to be used for a range of immediate needs rather than the
purpose stated on the document. The amount they gave
was always substantially lower than the amount stated on
the paper. Rather than reflecting reality, the formal peti-
tion document was a tool to be employed as a means to an
end; as Matthew Hull (2012, 253) has pointed out, bureau-
cratic documents are not “neutral purveyors of discourse,
but mediators that shape the significance of the signs in-
scribed on them and their relations with the objects they re-
fer to.” For the documentaires, what mattered was what the
document did. While giving is often presented as relatively
indeterminate despite the necessary time interval between
gift and countergift (Bourdieu 1998), bureaucratic regula-
tion can provoke affective interactions (Mbodj-Pouye 2016;
Navaro-Yashin 2007), and it ties transactions to a calendar
(Graeber 2011; Guyer 2012, 491). Obligation and debt be-
came matters of regulation, allowing for a temporally regu-
lated relationship with a donor, translating the act of beg-
ging into mutually acceptable, legitimate “disability taxes.”
In the process, documentaires attempted to transform what
donors viewed as a voluntary gift into an entitlement (Born-
stein 2012).
Contractual dependencies
Despite some of the documentaires’ denials, most peo-
ple continued to refer to “documents” as a type of beg-
ging rather than “fund-raising” or “tax collecting,” while
those who were particularly negative rejected begging as
“criminality.” Beggars’ attempts to transform bureaucratic
imitation into substance, and gift into entitlement, were
not entirely successful. But this does not mean that the
system was a failure or that imitation was redundant.
Mimesis brings together a wide variety of unstable mean-
ings that cannot be reduced to practices that do only one
thing at a time (Lempert 2014); in this case the practice of
exchanging documents expressed a desired form of mem-
bership (Ferguson 2002; Lund 2006, 697), and this was not
just an echo of the state but a key element of the practice.
The affect generated by personal documentation was vital
for documentaires’ social status, respect, and livelihoods,
since they saw in documents a form of support that was
otherwise unavailable. Creating these systems of registra-
tionmeant giving substance to a civic ethos of regulated in-
clusion rather than relying on the kindness of strangers.
For all its appeals to the regularity of state power and
state legitimacy, however, the documentaire system lacked
institutional support. The success of the petition, of its sym-
bols and logics, relied solely on an interpersonal exchange;
beggars ultimately depended on the willingness of donors
to give. Beneath the imagery of inclusion in the grand and
impersonal schemes of state and society, documents were
about cultivating the kind of personal relationships that
beggars really wanted, between the different valuations of
dependency and independence. For Claude, “responsible”
begging fulfilled the value of building a wide and meaning-
ful network of people he could depend on and giving him
the social respect he desired, while the ex-documentaire
Marc condemned begging as based on brutality rather than
social skills. Marc’s revolt against begging also absorbed
some of the logic of the suspicious donors, questioning the
personal value of the work of documentaires. “If you give
once, you have to continue giving,” the Lebanese business-
man and regular donor Mr. Amir told me. He refused to
give to a father who came with five children because he did
not want those children growing up with the mentality that
begging was acceptable and that they did not have to work
to earn money. Like Marc, he viewed continuous giving as
problematic. Begging was the opposite of “work”: degrad-
ing, making a person entirely reliant on the labor of others,
while with “work” a person had dignity in being notionally
independent.
But despite their disagreement on the desirability of
Claude’s choice of livelihood, Mr. Amir reflected some-
thing of Claude’s conception of the value of their engage-
ment. Giving to someone meant entering into a relation-
ship with them; the beggar would continue to come back,
and so choosing beggars was also choosing relationships.
Like Claude, Mr. Amir found value in reciprocal dependent
relationships, and both agreed that the state had a respon-
sibility to care for its vulnerable citizens. But value judg-
ments were never stable. From time to time, Claude andMr.
Amir disagreed about who “deserved” aid and why, as well
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as who should fill the void of unfulfilled state responsibility.
People often had mixed feelings, or their opinions changed
from one day to the next, be it Marc’s opposition to the bru-
tality involved in “documents” or the opinions of beggars
who were defiant on one day and ashamed the next. It was
also apparent in donors’ opinions, constantly shaping the
choice of who was “deserving” and who was not.
The first time I met Mr. Amir with Claude, he described
this form of begging as acceptable, telling me he chose to
give to Claude and his group because they had a long-term
relationship. He appreciated Claude’s calm behavior and
said handicape´s’ lack of work resulted from their physical
condition. A couple of months later, however, he expressed
suspicion about how beggars used his donations; he told
Claude he was capable of working, but the problem was his
mentality. The relationship between donor and beggar was
vital. It justified the donor’s decision to judge the recipient
deserving, and it strengthened the beggar’s choice to pursue
an activity of reliable income and, at least at first, of social
respect, in the face of widespread censure. Yet it was a rela-
tionship that was undoubtedly thin.
In the shifting judgments of this relationship, it is im-
possible to draw a strong distinction between understand-
ings of personhood wherein self-reliance or dependent
connections with others are more strongly valued. In the
language of both claim and criticism, the documentaire re-
lationship suggests that a person’s worth can be conceived
in terms of individual achievements as well as in terms
of relations to others; people in Kinshasa attach personal
value both to independent work andmembership in a com-
munity, and one does not win out over the other. But as
much as they conceive “work” as independent, labor it-
self can be an institutionalized form of dependence (e.g.,
Ferguson 2013; Grischow 2011). The Belgian colonizers
fashioned Kinshasa as a colonial labor camp from which
the unemployed were systematically removed, and where
dependence on an employer was a criterion for inclusion.
This history is still evoked by Kinshasa’s geography; most
beggars live in shared communities in the townships (the
cite´s) that emerged asmigrant labor camps during the colo-
nial period, but they come into the commercial center and
former European heart of the city (the ville), to find their
contractual donors. While relationships give value, citizen-
ship in this context was associated with labor, and as such
it comes as no surprise that beggars today prefer to refer to
themselves as NGO workers; they simultaneously claim the
value of honest, individual labor alongside its inclusionary,
dependent quality. Doing documents is an organized oc-
cupational activity that exaggerates such institutionalized
forms of dependence.
Ultimately, the contractual form of the relationship en-
capsulated its contradictions. Representing the documents
as “contractual” reflected the way bureaucracies express
a social contract between citizens and officials (Bear and
Mathur 2015). The “contract” notionally distributed respon-
sibility and organized it according to an agreed timetable,
serving as a placeholder for a dependent relationship both
parties knew was precarious. It allowed documentaires to
cast the brittle beggar-donor relationship as that between
employer and employee, a relationship that could allow the
chronically unemployed to partially, if ironically, engage in
the idea of being employed while claiming their “rightful
share” (Ferguson 2015) of deserved unemployment bene-
fits. Dependence can be understood as a valued achieve-
ment, and documentaires showed the explicit rendering of
such dependence as a form of work. Connoting a formal-
ization of mutual duties and the autonomy of independent
actors entering into a defined yet limited relationship, the
“contract” implied their search for balance between fulfill-
ing the values of “desired dependency” and independence,
reaping the benefits of both. A donor paid their dues, and
in return the beggars agreed to leave them alone for a year.
Intimacy and dependence, distance and autonomy, and the
relationship’s temporality were defined and regulated by a
contract of exchange.
Dependency can be a mode of action, but in cultivat-
ing contractual dependencies, beggars also seek a relative
distance and independence from their donors. Poverty can
make life provisional (De Boeck 2015); since dependencies
can be temporary and precarious (Bolt 2013), beggars seek
an agreement through which they can count on sponsor-
ship a number of times a year, which helps them manage
economic insecurity and establish a social value of “em-
ployment,” but without increasing untenable obligations
and limited freedom for themselves. “The Maussian gift is
sticky,” remarks TomHall (2005, para. 2.3), potentially lead-
ing to unwanted social obligations of reciprocity. The con-
tract therefore clarifies the extent and temporality of the
exchange, limiting both and thereby maintaining a certain
distance between the contracted parties. Creating distance
with donors allows documentaires to keep open strategies
of force and compulsion through which their relationships
stay brittle, but which may remain necessary to employ
from time to time. The document can therefore help bridge
the tensions of moral criticism and value conflict, yet the
distance remains; a beggar is always at risk from a sudden
rebellion from a donor who wishes their gift to be an act of
chosen benevolence and not obligation or debt. The risk of
dependence is thus best distributed among many patrons,
to compensate for such likely shifts in the moral debate.
Depending on the situation, therefore, beggars can
find more flexibility, security, and value in a large network
of looser relationships—in which they wield a power to
compel that often destroys their hope of receiving—than
in a small number of deeper relationships with more mu-
tual obligations. In an unpredictable urban environment,
begging allows disabled people to flexibly create a great
number of looser relationships, regulated by the “contract,”
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the quantity of which can make up for the quality of a
single employer-employee relationship. Personal success
depends on demonstrating a wide network of contacts
that one can call on when in need without being too
dependent on one or the other contact. Contractual depen-
dencies may limit the extent of obligations and dependen-
cies in the petitioner’s interests, as much as in those of an
ambivalent or doubtful donor. As they balance views of beg-
ging as acceptable, positive, or shameful, the relationships
that beggars pursue remain a compromised, unsatisfactory,
yet uncomfortably rewarding system of brittleness and
suspicion.
Contracts and compromise
Begging in Kinshasa offers an informal strategy for the
economic support of disabled people in the absence of a
state-organized system of social security. As an exceptional
and innovative type of begging in Kinshasa, the documen-
taires have created a remarkable system that reflects the
tensions of social judgment in the city. Rather than us-
ing references to religious charity, they speak the language
of NGO work and state responsibility for deserving citi-
zens, while also evoking civic obligations of contractual de-
pendency between individuals. Aiming to achieve essen-
tial economic support, they use symbols and strategies that
suggest an attempt to fulfill the apparently contradictory
social values of independence and dependence. The dy-
namics of cities allow beggars to be “more anonymous and
autonomous” (Groce, Loeb, and Murray 2014, 3), making
begging an inherently urban phenomenon. But the urban
environment is also apparent in begging’s explicit appeal
to bridge diverse multicultural codes and values that are
brought into contact, or conflict, in such environments,
including the desirable limitations of anonymity and au-
tonomy. The documentaires create dialogue between these
values, and through their “contract” briefly achieve a semi-
consensual compromise.
Yet the contract is easily broken. The beggars’ position
remains vulnerable and, often, uneasy in Kinshasa society.
Unenforced by the institutions it imitates, and established
only through donors’ consent, it is at best a temporary set-
tlement in an ongoing debate about who is “deserving” and
which activities count as “work.” The performances of co-
ercion that speckle the performances of urban convivial-
ity between “intimate strangers” (Nyamnjoh and Brudvig
2014) reveal this brittleness, under threat from judgments
on both sides of the exchange.
But for all this brittleness, both beggars and donors ex-
pected their relationship to be ongoing, even if donors did
not want this, or did not reach the depths of the “respon-
sible begging” that Claude described. The contract was al-
ways in danger of being broken, but it was always possi-
ble and even likely to be reinstituted, under renegotiated
terms. It was a temporary commitment that entailed a long-
term engagement. Never resolving the moral tensions over
value judgment, by stipulating an end date to their contrac-
tual dependency on others, the documentaires succeeded in
building a future that perhaps could not be relied on but
could at least be anticipated and therefore managed.
Despite assumptions to the contrary, personhood is
not something that must be universally conceptualized
in liberal frameworks of sustainability and self-reliance,
and subordinate relationships are not always paired with
lack of control or freedom (Englund 2006; Ferguson 2013;
Kowalski 2016;Mahmood 2005; Penfield 2017; Scherz 2014).
Ultimately, however, attention to practices of petitioning
reveals that even if the practicalities of asking for help
are very similar, people consider some dependent relation-
ships more morally valuable than others. Soliciting may
takemany forms, but while some styles present a petitioner
as problematically dependent on a giver, via others a peti-
tioner emerges as an enterprising individual.
While people may talk about the relationships associ-
atedwith these activities in binary terms of (in)dependence,
practices they view as entirely reliant on others may pro-
vide the security associated with being independent. Peti-
tioners seek a balance between an ability to rely on oth-
ers in dependent connections and freedom frompotentially
entangling reciprocities. They may navigate these tensions
by carefully selecting whom they establish hierarchical re-
lationships with. Contractual dependencies, therefore, are
not a passive imitation of organized welfare, but a way of
maintaining a balance between dependency and a degree
of desired autonomy from superiors. For both sides, hav-
ing agreed rules to regulate such unequal relationships can
be valuable, even if neither petitioner nor giver actually fol-
lows these rules. The “contract” allows dependents tomain-
tain a desired degree of morally valued distance; invoking
shared frames of reference and criticizing their absence or
failures, informal bureaucracies may lend temporal regu-
lation to subordinate relationships. The contract, contrary
to its image, frees subordinates from substantial reciprocity
while enabling them to voice claims about entitlement.
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1. When I refer to “disabled people” or use the emic term hand-
icape´ (a rough translation of the same), I refer to people who have
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physical disabilities. Most of my interlocutors were polio survivors,
and a few were amputees. I use pseudonyms for all my inter-
locutors. People spoke in a combination of Lingala and French; all
translations from both languages are my own.
2. I conducted research with disabled people in Kinshasa from
December 2012 to August 2014, with a follow-up visit from July to
August 2015. I spent most of my time interviewing disabled people
and engaging in participant observation with them in their various
livelihood activities.
3. Few could afford to make this act official; acquiring state doc-
uments to become an official NGO is lengthy and expensive, and
this discouraged most of them from pursuing this strategy.
4. All dollar amounts given in this article are in US dollars,
which Kinois often use for larger denominations. Although peo-
ple cited gift amounts in US dollars, it is possible that the money
was distributed in francs. If that were the case, the numbers would
be about 9,000,000 francs ($10,000), 900,000 francs ($1,000), and
4,500,000 francs ($5,000). During my fieldwork, the exchange rate
fluctuated from 900 to 930 francs for $1.
5. The Ministry of Social Affairs was another place in front of
which groups of disabled people spent hours in hopes of receiv-
ing support. One employee told me they were a constant presence;
they came regularly to ask for help with various expenses, such as
funerals, medical care, and housing.
6. Before and during my fieldwork, my interlocutors had been
affected by several “cleanup” operations. Beggars who frequented
the international border zonewere removedwhen Kinshasa hosted
the international meeting of francophone states in 2012. In 2013–
14, government officials cleared out two informal disability settle-
ments where many lived. And when the government carried out
a violent operation against gangsters (kuluna) in 2013–14, rumors
went around among beggars that friends had disappeared.
7. In playing with boundaries between fake and real, their activ-
ities were not unlike those of other urban dwellers such as scam-
mers (Newell 2012) or “false pastors” (Pype 2012, 42).
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